For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath."
Introduction
The success of a tournament highly depends on its design (Szymanski, 2003) , therefore several championships have been subject to rule changes to their structure in order to increase their attractiveness, for example, by increasing competitive balance. The evaluation of similar reforms is an important topic of operations research (Wright, 2009 (Wright, , 2014 Kendall and Lenten, 2017) .
The UEFA Champions League, commonly known as the Champions League, is the most prestigious annual club football competition in Europe. While its predecessor, the European Champion Clubs' Cup, was a standard knockout tournament contested exclusively by the champions of European leagues from the previous year, the rebranding of the competition in the 1992/93 season has added a round-robin group stage and has given slots to more teams from the strongest national leagues.
This paper aims to analyse the impact of a change in the qualifying system of the Champions League, effective from 2018, on the champions of the 43 lowest-ranked UEFA member associations. They compete in the Champions Path of the qualification, which is basically a knockout tournament currently consisting of five rounds, where each team enters the stage determined by the rank of its national association. The official access list for the 2019/20 UEFA Champions League can be found in (UEFA, 2019b, Annex A). Each round is drawn such that the teams are divided into the seeded and unseeded pots of equal size based on their UEFA club coefficients at the beginning of the season, and a seeded team plays against an unseeded team.
Qualification for the group stage of the Champions League remains a significant achievement for the majority of the 54 national champions in Europe. For example, Hungarian teams only two times participated in the group stage of the Champions League, Ferencvárosi TC in the 1995/96, and Debrecen in the 2009/10 season.
Playing in the Champions League is important for these teams at least from two aspects. First, it gives practically the only opportunity to face the leading European clubs such as FC Bayern München or Real Madrid CF. Second, it means a substantial source of revenue: in the 2019/20 season, the base fee of participating in the group stage was 15.25 million Euros (with a bonus of 2.7 million per win and 0.9 million per draw), while the base fee of participating in the group stage of the Europa League, the second-tier club competition organised by the UEFA, was 2.92 million Euros (and the bonuses are 0.57 per win and 0.19 million per draw), and elimination in the third qualifying round results in a mere 0.48 million Euros as solidarity payment (UEFA, 2019a) . The Champions League prize money is usually disproportionately high to the domestic income of these clubs (Menary, 2016) .
In order to evaluate the 2018 reform, we attempt to: 1) quantify the probability of qualification for the Champions League under the old and the new qualifying systems;
2) explore the role of seeding in the current qualifying system;
3) measure the effects of a change in the UEFA access list.
Since the actual real-world results represent only a single realisation of random variables, the ex-ante expected probabilities are calculated through Monte-Carlo simulations. The UEFA Champions League has been the subject of a large number of academic works, therefore only a sample of connected articles are listed here. According to Page and Page (2007) , playing the second leg at home in the knockout phase of European cups, including the Champions League, means a significant (albeit somewhat declining) advantage. This finding has been reinforced in Geenens and Cuddihy (2018) but has been questioned recently by Amez et al. (2019) . Eugster et al. (2011) conclude that, in the case of the Champions League, the observed difference can be attributed to the performance in the group stage and the teams' general strength. Scarf et al. (2009) estimate various tournament metrics for several tournament designs of the Champions League. The procedure used by the UEFA for the Round of 16 draw is found to lead to strange probabilities for certain pairings Klößner and Becker (2013) . Boczoń and Wilson (2018) aim to understand and analyse the mechanism for the Round of 16 draw using the tools of market design. While match outcomes in the lower rounds of the Champions League are less uncertain compared to its predecessor European Champion Clubs' Cup, competitive balance has increased at the later stages (Schokkaert and Swinnen, 2016) . Dagaev and Rudyak (2019) examine the competitiveness changes in the UEFA Champions League and Europa League implied by reforming the group stage seeding in the Champions League from the 2015/16 season. Corona et al. (2019) evaluate these two seeding regimes by taking into account the uncertainty of parameter estimates in a Bayesian framework. Guyon (2019) proposes a new knockout format for the Champions League, which applies the policy of "choose your opponent".
However, less research is devoted to studying the qualifying system of the UEFA Champions League. According to Green et al. (2015) , an increase in the number of slots in the Champions League that a national league is entitled to leads to higher investment in talent, especially among clubs that just failed to qualify in the previous season. The prize money distributed by the UEFA for participation in the Champions League can threaten with a hegemony emerging in smaller European leagues (Menary, 2016) . Finally, Csató (2019b) investigates the theoretical property of incentive compatibility in the Champions League entry.
Our article is also strongly related to the studies comparing different real-world tournament designs. Besides the already mentioned papers focusing on the UEFA Champions League (Scarf et al., 2009; Corona et al., 2019; Dagaev and Rudyak, 2019) , Goossens et al. (2012) evaluate four formats that have been considered by the Royal Belgian Football Association with respect to the importance of the games, Lasek and Gagolewski (2018) analyse the efficacy of the tournament formats used in the majority of European top-tier association football competitions, while Csató (2019a) investigate the hybrid structures of the recent World Men's Handball Championships.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the Champions League qualification. The simulation model is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 illuminates our findings, and Section 5 summarises them.
The qualifying system of the Champions League
The slots in the UEFA Champions League are allocated based on the ranking of UEFA member associations according to their UEFA coefficients, determined by the performances of the corresponding clubs during the previous five seasons of international club competitions. Dagaev and Rudyak (2019, Appendix A.1) provide the details of its calculation. Higher-ranked associations are entitled to more places in the group stage and/or their teams have to contest fewer qualification rounds to increase the probability of reaching the group stage, the only exception being that certain positions are not distinguished by the access list: for example, the champions of the 14th and 15th associations alike enter the third qualifying round in the current qualifying system.
Teams without a direct slot in the Champions League participate in its qualification tournament, which is divided into two separate paths since the 2009/10 season: the Champions Path for the champions of lower-ranked national associations, and the League Path contested by the teams that did not win their higher-ranked domestic leagues. 1 There is another way to obtain a quota in the group stage. The English Premier League received four places in the 2005/06 Champions League, however, the winner of the 2004/05 Champions League, Liverpool FC, finished only fifth in the championship. Therefore, UEFA made a one-off exception by allowing the team to defend its title and amended the qualification criteria such that the Champions League titleholder has a guaranteed slot in the next season. 2 Analogously, the winner of the UEFA Europa League in the previous season entered the play-off round of the League Path in the three seasons played between 2015 and 2018, while it directly qualifies for the group stage of the Champions League from the 2018/19 season.
This policy can create a vacant slot somewhere in the qualifying system if a titleholder also qualifies from its domestic championship. Filling the vacancy is a nontrivial task since it may lead to incentive incompatibility (Dagaev and Sonin, 2018) , for instance, in the Champions League between 2015 and 2018 (Csató, 2019b) . The exact rules are described in UEFA (2017, Article 3) for the 2017/18 and UEFA (2018, Article 3) for the 2018/19 seasons. For the sake of simplicity, in our simulations, the Champions League titleholder is assumed to qualify for the group stage of the Champions League through its domestic championship. 3 Because a vacancy created in the group stage by the Europa League titleholder is filled via rebalancing the League Path, it is enough to exclude the case that this team is the champion of a national association ranked 12th or lower, which seems reasonable, too.
Finally, the number of UEFA member associations competing in the European club competitions is fixed at 55 only since the 2017/18 season when teams from Kosovo joined.
The Champions League qualification is regulated in three-year cycles since 2012, namely, the access list that determines the slots allocated to a given rank among the national associations is unchanged for three seasons (2012-15, 2015-18, 2018-21) . On the other hand, the actual ranking is updated every year. For example, the 11th ranked association was the Czech Republic in the 2018/19 and Austria in the 2019/20 season, thus FC Viktoria Plzeň and FC Salzburg directly entered the group stage in these seasons, respectively.
The access list has seen a substantial modification between the 2015-18 and 2018-21 cycles. As it has already been mentioned, the impact of this change on the Champions Path, that is, on the probability of qualification for the champions of lower-ranked leagues, will be evaluated in the following. The preliminary round (PR), launched in the 2018/19 season, is played as one-legged semi-finals and final hosted by one of the four competing clubs drawn randomly. In the qualifying rounds Q1-Q3 and in the play-off round (PO), teams play two-legged home-and-away matches.
In all rounds, the clubs are allocated into seeded and unseeded pots containing the same number of teams based on their UEFA club coefficients at the beginning of the season, which quantifies their performance in the last five seasons of the UEFA Champions League and Europa League (Dagaev and Rudyak (2019, Appendix A. 2) details the computation of the UEFA club coefficient). A seeded team is drawn against an unseeded team. Although the UEFA club coefficients of the teams are fixed during the qualification, the winners of the previous round are not known at the time of the draws, hence the club with the higher coefficient is assumed to advance. In other words, if an unseeded team qualifies for the next round, it effectively carries over the coefficient of its opponent to the next round but not further.
As an illustration, consider the case of the Hungarian champion Ferencvárosi TC in the 2019/20 UEFA Champions League qualification. Since Hungary was the 29th association, the club entered the first qualifying round (Q1). Its coefficient was 3.5, a rather low value. Ferencvárosi TC managed to reach the third qualifying round as follows:
• Q1: it was unseeded, and played against the seeded PFC Ludogorets 1945 from Bulgaria, which also entered Q1 with a coefficient of 27, one of the highest at this stage -Ferencvárosi TC advanced to Q2;
• Q2: it was considered with a coefficient of 27, was seeded, and played against Valletta FC from Malta, which was considered with a coefficient of 6.25 due to its advance against F91 Dudelange from Luxembourg in Q1 (the real coefficient of Valletta FC was 4.25) -Ferencvárosi TC advanced to Q3;
• Q3: it was considered with a coefficient of 4.25, was unseeded, and played against GNK Dinamo Zagreb from Croatia (coefficient: 29.5), which entered Q2 and advanced against FC Saburtalo from Georgia (coefficient: 0.95) -Ferencvárosi TC was eliminated.
Methodology
The aims of our study, outlined in the Introduction, will be achieved by quantifying the probability of qualification for the group stage of the UEFA Champions League via Monte-Carlo simulations. The two qualifying systems are known from Section 2, thus they can be simulated repeatedly if we have a prediction model for the outcome of the matches. For this purpose, first, the teams entering the Champions Path of the 2019/20 Champions League qualification, that is, the champions of the associations 12-55 in the 2018/19 season, are considered. Second, their strengths are estimated by the club Elo ratings, available at http://clubelo.com/. 4 A team's Elo rating is based on its past results such that the same result against a stronger opponent has more value and the influence of a game decreases after new games are played (Van Eetvelde and Ley, 2019) . While there exists no single nor any official Elo rating for football clubs, Elo-inspired methods seem to outperform other measures with respect to prediction power (Lasek et al., 2013) . They have also been widely used in the academic literature (Hvattum and Arntzen, 2010; Lasek et al., 2016; Cea et al., 2019; Csató, 2019c) .
The Elo ratings of http://clubelo.com/ modify the standard Elo system by taking into account home advantage and goal difference. Note also that in two-legged matches, which are played in the Champions League qualification except for the preliminary round from the 2018/19 season, the clubs are not necessarily interested in winning one match (and perhaps losing the other), but they focus primarily on advancing to the next round. Therefore, the aggregated result over the two legs determines the total number of exchanged points, multiplied by the square root of 2 compared to a single game. Because the number of away goals scored is the tie-breaking rule if the aggregated scores are level, advancing due to away goals counts as a win by a half goal margin.
The teams of our sample are listed in Table 2 together with their slot in the qualifying system, national association, UEFA club coefficient, and ClubElo rating. The underlying database contains all international matches played in the UEFA Champions League and the UEFA Europa League, as well as in their predecessors (see http://clubelo.com/Data). Domestic league results are taken into account in some higher-ranked associations as indicated in Table 2 , and the second division of the five strongest associations (Spain, England, Italy, Germany, France) are also included. Hence the ratings of teams from lower-ranked associations are calculated only from relatively few international matches and thus could be more uncertain, however, the benefit from extending the dataset with many games involving clubs whose Elo is pure speculation remains questionable. Furthermore, these teams have no reasonable chance to participate in the Champions League as we will see.
Elo ratings are dynamic but the underlying strengths of the teams are assumed to remain static during the whole Champions League qualification, played over approximately two months between the end of June and the end of August. The UEFA club coefficients are also fixed for a given season. Nonetheless, it is worth taking the performance of the clubs in the qualifying phase into account, therefore we have decided to use the Elo ratings from 30 August 2019, because the last matches of the 2019/20 UEFA Champions League (Europa League) qualification were played on 28 (29) August 2019.
Consequently, the a priori probability that team with an Elo of advances against team with an Elo of is given by
in the one-legged matches of the preliminary round, and by
in two-legged home-and-away matches of qualifying rounds Q1-Q3 and PO, where = − is the difference between the Elo ratings of the two teams, and is a scaling parameter. = 400 in the calculation of ClubElo rating. We have implemented the simulations for various number of independent runs. Figure 1 shows the average Elo rating of the teams qualified for the group stage of the Champions League as a function of the number of iterations. On the basis of these calculations, every simulation has been run one million times.
In each iteration, a 43 × 43 binary matrix of match outcomes has been generated randomly for all possible pairs of teams based on formulas (1) and (2). This matrix is plugged into both qualifying systems to record the set of the six and four qualified teams, respectively. 5
Results
Now we are able to evaluate the effects of changing the qualifying system of the Champions League in 2018. Figure 2 reveals the impact of the reform on the probability of reaching the group stage. The novel design is detrimental for all teams, except for the champion of the Czech Republic (association 13), SK Slavia Praha, which has to win only one clash in the post-2018 regime instead of two. On the other hand, the champion of association 12 (in our sample, BSC Young Boys from Switzerland) loses its guaranteed place in the group stage, leading to the greatest decline in the probability of participating in the Champions League.
Besides SK Slavia Praha and AFC Ajax from the Netherlands -a semifinalist in the 2018/19 season, which is an outstanding team in our dataset -, the reduction in this measure is above 10 percentage points for the clubs having a reasonable chance of at least 20% to advance to the group stage. The corresponding loss in monetary terms is more than 100 thousand Euros per percentage point with the conservative assumption that playing in the Champions League yields 10 million Euros compared to the alternatives (see the discussion in the Introduction). Naturally, the absolute changes are smaller for weaker teams, however, they prove to be quite substantial in relative terms. For example, the Hungarian champion Ferencvárosi TC qualifies for the Champions League with almost 5% probability according to the old format, but only with 2% in the current design.
A sensitivity analysis can be carried out by changing the scaling parameter in formulas (1) and (2). The results given by the values = 600 and = 800, which increase competitive balance between the teams, are shown in Figure 3 . The impact of the reform remains robust with respect to this variable, although the odds vary: the Hungarian champion Ferencvárosi TC has about 2% probability to enter the group stage in the baseline case of = 400, approximately 3.5% if = 600, and 4.5% if = 800, while the corresponding probabilities under the old qualifying system are 4.9%, 7.3%, and 8.8%, respectively. Figure 4 measures responsiveness by focusing on the role of seeding. Its elimination can change the probability of qualification at most around 8 percentage points, and has the highest effect on the teams with a relatively high (the champions of Croatia, Denmark, Scotland) or low (the champions of Czech Republic, Greece, Romania) UEFA club coefficient compared to the average in the relevant qualifying round(s). The impact The impact of the reform for national associations The probability of qualificiation under the old (pre-2018) system
The impact of the reform as a function of the probability of qualification
of seeding can also be remarkable in relative terms, for example, the Romanian champion The effect of seeding as a function of (log) UEFA club coefficient
CFR 1907 Cluj qualifies with a probability of 9%, which would increase to 12.5% in the absence of seeding. Nevertheless, it is still less than the 15% under the old system (and the almost 25% under the old system without seeding). Returning to Ferencvárosi TC, it would have a 3.5% chance to play in the Champions League if UEFA would use a random draw in the qualifying.
Probably the best illustration of the role of seeding is offered by the comparison of the champions from Azerbaijan and Hungary. Both teams enter the first qualifying round, and they have almost the same Elo rating (1472 vs 1468), resulting in approximately the same chance to qualify without seeding (3.75% vs 3.54%). However, the Azerbaijan club has a much better UEFA coefficient (22 vs 3.5), hence its actual probability of reaching the group stage is more than two times higher (4.17% vs 2.06%). Consequently, although the impact of seeding is smaller compared to the effect of the 2018 reform, it has still a great influence on the qualifying system.
It is also worth studying what happens if the access list is modified. In particular, we have considered changing associations 13 (Czech Republic) and 14 (Netherlands), which is an especially relevant issue because in the five seasons since 2015/16, Netherlands has occupied the positions 8th, 9th, 10th, 13th, 14th, respectively. Furthermore, as Table 2 shows, the champion of the Netherlands (AFC Ajax) is obviously a stronger team than the champion of the Czech Republic (SK Slavia Praha). The effects are demonstrated in Figure 5 . Unsurprisingly, AFC Ajax becomes the greatest winner, and SK Slavia Praha becomes the greatest loser as the former has to play one clash less, and the latter one clash more. The champion of Greece is also better off because the probability that it faces the stronger AFC Ajax markedly decreases. Three other teams, the champions of Croatia, Denmark, and Scotland are affected negatively as altogether four teams qualify from the Champions Path, and -besides AFC Ajax -they have the largest UEFA club coefficient, hence they cannot play against the outstanding champion from the Netherlands during the qualification, but the odds of facing the fourth strongest team, SK Slavia Praha, increase. The impact of making the qualification more "balanced" on other clubs remains more opaque but the changes are modest anyway. Finally, Table 3 reports the expected strength of Champions League participants for the various designs of the Champions Path. By being more selective, the current qualifying system definitely carries stronger teams to the group stage with respect to both measures, UEFA club coefficient, and ClubElo rating. The former has risen by more than 2 points, which corresponds to one win or two draws in the group stage of the Champions League. The latter means that the average team qualifying from the Champions Path has a 8.3% and 9.54% chance to defeat the titleholder Liverpool FC (which had an Elo rating of 2055 on 30 August 2019) under the old and the new systems, respectively, as calculated from formula (1). This discriminating effect substantially exceeds the impact of seeding. Similarly, changing the access list in favour of the best club also increase the real strength of the qualified teams. However, the improvement in the expected UEFA club coefficient is mainly due to the extremely high value of AFC Ajax: its coefficient is more than double of any other team's coefficient as can be seen in Table 2 .
Conclusions
We have studied how the new qualifying system of the UEFA Champions League, introduced from the 2018/19 season, has changed the probability of reaching the group stage for the champions of lower-ranked UEFA associations. Our simulations reveal that only one team among the 43 considered has benefited from the reform, but nine clubs have lost more than one million Euros in expected prize. The results are robust with respect to competitive balance. The seeding used by the UEFA in the draw of qualifying matches has a substantial impact, although changing the format of the qualification has had more serious implications. The probability of qualification is also influenced by the ranking of UEFA associations, however, the consequences of modifying the access list depend on the characteristics of the particular teams. While the novel design carries stronger teams to the group stage on average, it is mainly due to its selectiveness.
Our estimates are quite considerable compared to the results calculated by Dagaev and Rudyak (2019) , where the seeding regimes in the Champions League group stage change only marginally the tournament metrics chosen. Thus the reform considered here has more important economic consequences than modifying the pots in the draw of the group stage, however, admittedly for less prestigious European clubs.
The current research has several limitations since the effects of the reform have been illustrated only by one set of inputs, namely, the clubs participating in the 2019/20 Champions League qualifying phase. This assumption can be defended because tournament designers cannot influence the set of competitors, furthermore, we have followed the standard approach of the literature (see, e.g., Scarf et al. (2009); Corona et al. (2019) ; Dagaev and Rudyak (2019) ). Naturally, the set of particular clubs will vary from season to season. Other datasets are expected to provide the same qualitative results but absolute values might appear different.
To conclude, the UEFA has clearly lifted the barriers to participation in the Champions League for most European champions from the 2018/19 season. This is in stark contrast to the implications of reforming the seeding in the group stage, effective from 2016, which has favoured the champions of the highest-ranked associations (Corona et al., 2019; Dagaev and Rudyak, 2019) . Consequently, the UEFA Champions League has become rather a playground of leading European associations, and has moved farther from its original concept of being a "league of champions". While the goal of the reform has been probably commercial or political, the results presented here yield an important insight into the possible effects of changing the qualifying system and can be valuable for all stakeholders, especially because UEFA plans to make the Champions League even more distorted for the elite clubs (Panja, 2019) .
